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The Problem Case - "The Evil That Men Do"
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A forum for the expression of readers' views on:

MORALITY IN LEGAL PRACTICE

The present hypothetical, which originally appeared in the Winter '60
issue of THE CATHOLIC LAWYER, is offered to stimulate the thinking of

our readers upon some moral implications of the use of statutory. objections to exclude evidence, of formal. pleadings without factual support,
and of offering evidence yielding inferences which are negatived by
known facts. The setting is in probate practice, but the generic problems
recur in other branches of the law.
Father Cahill's solution is set forth immediately following the
reprinted problem.

"THE EVIL THAT MEN DO . . .
A petition, asking the probate of a certain writing as the last will and
testament of Baron Black, has been filed in the State of New Island by
James Joiner, attorney for George Green. The petition shows that the
deceased left him surviving George Green, who is named as executor in
the will offered, Gertrude Gray, a first cousin and a named legatee, and
The Pebble Beach Orphanage, a charitable institution incorporated in
the State of New Island, interested as residuary legatee. It shows, further,
that the decedent left him surviving no widow and no distributee other
than Gertrude Gray. The propounded instrument gives a legacy of
$5,000 to Gertrude Gray, and the residue of the estate to the
Orphanage.'
Black was a resident of New Island from January 1, 1957 until he
died on November 2, 1959. Joiner and Green have inventoried the
property of Black's estate; they find that all of it is situated in New
Island and they estimate its value at $60,000.
Objection to probate has been filed by Samuel Sawyer, attorney for

I The

law of New Island does not limit the amount of charitable gifts made by
will, or invalidate such gifts or wills containing them because such wills were made
within a limited period before the testator's death. Such gifts may, of course, be
diminished by exercise of a surviving spouse's right of election which is mentioned
in footnote 3.
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Gertrude Gray, alleging that "the instrument offered for probate was
not freely and voluntarily executed by the decedent as his last will, but
was obtained, and the subscription and publication thereof were procured, if in fact itwas subscribed and published by the testator, by fraud
"'2
and undue influence.
Objection has been filed also by Carl Carpenter, attorney for Molly
Mauve, a resident of the State of Connshire, who asserts that by reason
of a common-law marriage contracted in that state she has an interest
in the proceeding as Black's surviving spouse. Her objection alleges that
"at the time the instrument offered for probate purports to have been
executed, the decedent was not competent to make a will in that he was
not at that time of sound mind and memory."
The judge in whose court the petition and objections were filed asked
the three lawyers to confer with Francis Farmer who is attorney for the
Orphanage, for the purpose of discovering whether the issues raised by
the pleadings may be settled amicably. When the lawyers met, Carpenter
announced that as soon as letters are issued he will demand payment of
a debt of $4,000 owing to his client from the deceased since 1956. If
probate be denied, his client, as widow, will claim the entire estate. If the
will be admitted, she will exercise her right as surviving spouse to take
against the will.3 Farmer remarked that the Orphanage trustees were
distressed by the prospect of litigation, particularly if it were to bring
to public attention allegations of fraud, insanity and meretricious relations. Joiner and Sawyer said that they could contribute nothing to the
purpose of the conference until they had discussed Carpenter's statements with their clients.
Green told Joiner he is certain that Black died owing Molly $4,000.
He learned from a Mr. and Mrs. Ben Brown, friends of Black, that the
decedent had borrowed "about $4,000" from Molly Mauve while they
were living together in Connshire and had not repaid the loan. Green has
a passbook representing an account opened by Black in July of 1956,
in which only one deposit, in amount $4,000, was made and from which
In New Island practice, objections to probate of a will may be filed in the forms
illustrated in this and the following paragraph of the accompanying text. In the
papers filed, no more particular facts need be alleged.
3 In the law of New Island, the widow of an intestate who leaves him surviving
no descendant, parent, brother, sister, nephew or niece, is entitled to the entire net
estate of the decedent intestate. If a decedent's will, admitted to probate, gives less
than half the net estate to a widow who survives him, she may elect to take, against
the will, her intestate share. Her share, however, is limited in such a case to one
half portion of the net estate, and the will is effective to dispose of that portion
of the estate which is not taken by the electing spouse.
2
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there were no withdrawals. Green does not find any indication of withdrawals from Black's other accounts which might have been made to pay
the debt. Green, however, does not find Molly Mauve's name in the small
account book in which Black had listed promissory notes issued by him.
Sawyer had not yet told Gertrude Gray about Molly Mauve's objection
in the probate proceedings. When she learned of this and of Farmer's
remarks, she asked Sawyer to inquire of Farmer what part of the residue
the Orphanage might give her if she withdrew her objection. She said,
"As I told you, I have nothing to go on except my own feeling that
Cousin Baron must have been pressured by the Orphanage trustees when
he gave the home so large a share in his will. You told me we would not
need facts to put in the court papers, but that we'd better have facts if it
came to a trial.I think we'd better settle with the Orphanagenow, before
they start dickering with Molly."
Carpenter asked Molly Mauve for authorization to inquire of Francis
Farmer what money settlement the Orphanage might offer her for withdrawing her objection to probate and for not asserting her right as widow
to share in the estate. Molly replied that Carpentermight so inquire, but
he should insist that the $4,000 debt must be paid to her in any event.
Carpenter pointed out to his client that any representative of the estate
would have the right to object to admission of her testimony on her dealings with Black in the matter of the detbt.4 Therefore, he counselled her

that she should throw into her negotiations with the Orphanage her
promise not to pursue this debt. He said to her, "We know the debt is
owing, but we have no proof in writing, and you are the only witness. If
Green knows of the debt, he may pay it without difficulty, but if he
doesn't know of it or doesn't want to pay it, he can bar your testimony
and prevent your enforcing it." She accepted his advice, and he continued, "We cannot offer proof to sustain our objection to probate, for you
have told me from the beginning that you know no facts indicating that
Black was not fully competent when he made his will. We put in that
objection only to broaden your bargainingposition as widow. Your claim
to a widow's share, against the will or in intestacy, is our strongest point
in the bargaining, and we can make it stand up on trial. I know from
New Island has a "dead-man's statute" which provides that in any trial or hearing
on the merits, a person interested in the event, or a person through whom another
person has acquired an interest in the event, shall not be examined as a witness
on his own behalf, or on behalf of such other person, against the representative or
successor in interest of a deceased person, concerning a personal transaction or
communication between the witness and the deceased person. The deceased person's representative or successor may waive the prohibition of the statute only at a
trial or hearing on the merits. To exclude such testimony at the trial or hearing,
a proper objection is required.
4
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what you have told me that Black never meant to make you his wife. He
lied to you about his having an 'ever-faithful teen-age wife,' and he used
that as an excuse for not having a marriage ceremony with you, and for
not putting in writing anything which would show that he and you had
contracted a common-law marriage,as you could do legally in Connshire.
He used it in the same way when he told you his conscience would not
permit him to participatein an exchange of marriage vows between the
two of you alone; you recall that you proposed such an exchange at my
suggestion. It was only at Christmas time in 1956 that you told him 1 had
investigated that 'teen-age marriage' of his and found he had never married. You told me he then admitted that he had never married anyone,
but said he had determined to leave you, and he did leave a few days
later. Yet we can call a dozen witnesses who can say truthfully that he
introduced you as his wife to people in Connshire who knew you were
living together there, that he paid bills there which were charged to you
as Mrs. Baron Black, and that in the neighborhood where you and he
lived together for three years you were reputed to be his wife." 5
Moral Questions:
1.

Should Green, as Black's representative, pay the $4,000 debt to
Molly Mauve without having that debt established on a trial?

2. Should Green, through Joiner, object to the admission of Molly
Mauve's testimony on the debt at a trial which will determine that
the debt is owing?
3.

What is the moral quality of the conduct of Sawyer and his client
Gertrude Gray, and that of Carpenterand his client Molly Mauve,
in objecting to probate of Black's will?

4.

What is the moral quality of the purposes of Carpenter and his
client Molly Mauve, to bargain with the Orphanage for the withdrawal of her widow's claim, or to pursue that claim on trial?.

The highest court of New Island has held in a similar case, "Our courts may
draw, from evidence that a woman was reputed in the State of Connshire to be the
wife of a certain man when she lived with him in that State, the inference that
the agreement in praesenti, which alone creates marriage in the common law of
that State, had been made between that man and that woman."

